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The Economics of a Landing Obligation: Short Term Impacts for the Danish 
Fishery of Implementing the EU Landing Obligation 
 
Peder Andersen and Lisa Ståhl  
Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen 
Contact: pean@ifro.ku.dk or list@ifro.ku.dk 
 
Abstract 
By 2015 The European Common Fisheries Policy Reform includes a landing obligation in some 
fisheries and over the next few years all EU fisheries will be facing the obligation to land all catches. 
In spite of that, there is a lack of theoretical as well as empirical analyses of the consequences of a 
landing obligation. The paper includes an empirical analysis of the landing obligation’s impact on the 
Danish fishery in the short run. In the first part of the paper, we survey the fisheries economics 
literature for theoretical findings regarding behavioural aspects of a discard ban and we exploring 
gaps in our knowledge. A comprehensive analysis of the short term economic impacts of the discard 
ban for the Danish fleet under various assumptions regarding costs of handling previously discarded 
fish, prices obtained for them, selectivity, minimum sizes, and quota utilization is presented. Among 
other things, the analysis shows that the fisheries will suffer economic losses under the landing 
obligation if quotas are not increased with the historical discard rate. With quota top-ups however 
fisheries can experience economic gains which increase with reduced minimum sizes or by increasing 
selectivity. 
Keywords: fisheries economics, bioeconomics, fisheries management, discard ban, landing 
obligation 
 
Introduction  
In 2013, the European Union’s (EU) reform of the Common Fishery Policy (CFP) entailed a landing 
obligation (L.O.). A biological motivation for the L.O. is the encouragement of increased selectivity 
and the following effects on marine ecosystems in line with the CFP’s goals. An ethical motivation 
for the L.O. is to reduce resource waste in that previously discarded fish that still cannot be avoided 
in the catch can be used for industry or consumption purposes. The L.O. is being implemented from 
2015 and onwards starting with pelagic and industrial species as well as salmon in the Baltic Sea. 
From 2019 the L.O. covers all quota species in all areas. There are some exemptions to the L.O., e.g. 
related to survivability (EU, 2013).  
 
The theoretical understanding of why discarding takes place and what can be done to alleviate it is 
well understood. However, knowledge is limited on the actual impacts of trying to regulate discarding 
through a landing obligation. By analyzing the short-run effects of the L.O. in the Danish fishery, this 
paper aims to add to the empirical knowledge of economic impacts of the L.O. The L.O. covers many 
species highly valuable in the Danish fisheries. The analysis makes use of the fishery’s performance 
in 2013 as a baseline and then imposes the L.O., keeping the fishery patterns constant. The economic 
impacts are calculated as changes compared to the baseline for the average vessel in each vessel 
group. Under different assumptions about management regime, costs, prices, and behavior, different 
scenarios are analyzed. Medium or longer run changes, e.g. changes in fishing patterns and complex 
behavior nor biological impacts due to these changes are analyzed. Furthermore, full enforcement is 
assumed.  
                                                          
Empirical findings in this paper are published in Ravensbeck et al. (2015). A short version of this paper can 
be found in the IIFET Conference Proceedings 2016.  
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Theory 
The theoretical framework for analyzing the effects of a landing obligation lies within the literature 
of discarding behavior; see e.g. Anderson (1994), Arnason (1994), and Vestergaard (1996). 
Discarding certain catches may take place for various reasons and can be linked to bycatch or high-
grading, see e.g. Frost et al. (2015); bycatch cannot be avoided completely in an imperfectly selective 
fishery and may be discarded if illegal to land. High-grading is the decision to discard less valuable 
fish in favor of catching more valuable fish of the same species on the quota. Several factors can play 
a role in a fisherman’s decision whether to land certain catches; catchability of target and non-target 
fish, distributions of species in catch, prices, costs of processing and discarding, distance from harbor 
to fishing area, stock effects, regulation type, as well as the probability and scale of legal punishment 
(Frost et al., 2015).  
 
These factors feed into the decision making of the fisherman. The decision process is illustrated in 
the figure below. As described by Frost et al. (2015), the fisherman faces restrictions by policy-makers 
such as quotas or closed areas (box 3). With these restrictions in mind, he decides on a fishing effort 
(box 1) and obtains a catch which dependent on the species and age distribution (box 2) comprises of 
target and non-target species and sizes (box 4). Box 5 shows that with a marketable catch at hand the 
fisherman may choose to high-grade and thus discard some of the catch (box 9). Although not high-
grading he may face restrictions on minimum sizes or have landed amounts above the quota (box 7) 
which may contribute to the choice to discard (box 9). If there are no such restrictions, the catch may 
be landed (box 10). Box 6 shows that the fisherman’s catch may consist of illegally caught fish, e.g. 
above-quota catches, but if there is a low probability of legal punishment the catch may be landed 
and sold on a black market (box 8). If the probability of punishment is high, the catch may be 
discarded (box 9). These decisions will depend on the net income from legal and illegal catches and 
the probability of detection and the size of the fine. The potential income from boxes 8, 9, and 10 
feed into the fisherman’s profit maximization in box 11 together with the costs of fishing in box 1.  
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Figure 1. Behavior under restrictions 
 
Source: Frost et al. (2015) 
 
With the landing obligation, the previous discards in box 9 have to be landed and these achieve a 
lower price than wanted and marketable landings. This affects the fisherman’s profit in varying 
degrees depending largely on the amount of previous discarding and whether the management system 
in box 3 is based on quota top-ups or write-offs. The profit maximization also depends on the costs 
of handling and landing previously discarded catch, whether the minimum sizes are reduced, and 
whether quota utilization of more valuable species can be improved. 
 
Methodology  
The economic impacts of the L.O. are calculated as changes against a baseline without a L.O. The 
baseline is the fishery as it was in 2013. The analysis locks the fishery patterns as they were in 2013 
and the calculations are carried out as if the full L.O. is implemented at once on the fishery in 2013. 
Under the L.O. the fishermen thus continue their catch patterns, including where they fish, while 
facing a new management regime. 
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Changes are calculated for revenue, variable costs, profitability, wages and gross margin. Revenue is 
defined as landings value. Variable costs consist of fuel, ice, supplies, landings and sales costs. 
Profitability is the landings value minus the variable costs. Wages are assumed to be in proportion to 
the landed value and thus change with the change in revenue. The gross margin is the landings value 
minus variable costs and wages. As it is assumed that neither fixed costs nor fishery patterns change 
in the short run, these are not considered in the analysis. 
Overall, without the L.O. landings equal catch minus discards. Under the L.O. landings equal catches. 
The analysis considers scenarios with a management regime of quota top-ups and situations without 
quota top-ups, i.e. landings of previously discarded fish are written off on the quota. Landings above 
the minimum size and thus aimed at human consumption are labelled marketable landings (ML). 
Under quota top-ups marketable landings (MLN,Q) are simply the old amount of marketable landings 
(LO), that is; MLN,Q=LO since the quota has simply been increased with the former amount of discard. 
Without quota top-ups, marketable landings (MLN) are reduced by the amount of previously discarded 
fish; MLN=LO(1-dp), where dp is the discard percentage.  
The analysis then explores what happens when assumptions change regarding handling costs, 
minimum sizes, and behavioral related to quota utilization and a of a 25 % avoidance of previously 
discarded fish. This is done while keeping the fishery patterns as they were in 2013 and under regimes 
of either quota top-ups or quota write-offs.  
By assumption, vessels’ behavior is driven by the species they have quotas for. Therefore, only 
landings data on quota species are directly included in the analysis and changes in landings of these 
species drive the economic results. Landings of non-quota species change in proportion to changes in 
effort and are thus indirectly included in the analysis. Changes in the amount of fish landed, be it 
quota or non-quota species, are assumed not to change prices obtained at harbor or at fish meal and 
oil factories. 
Stock effects, technology changes, complex behavioral changes such as change of fishing area or 
quota purchases, imperfect enforcement nor choke species issues are considered in the analysis. 
Choke species are species which quotas are fished before those of the target species and therefore the 
fishery has to stop. This could for example be cod caught while targeting Norway lobster. Further, 
only demersal species and no pelagic or industrial species are considered in the analysis. Downstream 
effects are assessed by an input/output model, while long-term effects are assessed descriptively.  
 
Data 
The analysis made use of publicly available data for 2013 on Danish landings and quotas obtained 
through the AgriFish Agency and economic data obtained through Statistics Denmark. The year 2013 
was chosen since this was the most recent year with final economic data in the database. The discard 
ratios per species based on vessel type and area has been estimated by DTU Aqua (see Ravensbeck 
et al., 2015).  
Because of data limitations, only demersal species are considered. Demersal fisheries do indeed face 
issues regarding selectivity, e.g. minimum sizes, thus being impacted to a large degree by the landing 
obligation. 
 
The landed but previously discarded fish, that is fish below the minimum size for consumption, is 
assumed to supply the fish oil and meal industry, obtaining a price of DKK 2/kg (Marine Ingredients, 
2015). The price of transportation to the fish oil and meal plant has been estimated to DKK 1/kg by 
COWI (2015). Thus previously discarded fish obtain a sales price of DKK 1/kg.   
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Vessel data in the database is at the level of length or gear group. Only non-specialized vessels at 
commercial activity levels1 are included. Specialized fisheries target e.g. mussels and are managed 
by licenses and not individual transferrable quotas (ITQs) as the rest of the Danish fishery. The 
analysis is thereby carried out for 19 segments and for the North Sea fleet, Baltic Sea fleet, and 
Skagerrak/Kattegat fleet, as well as the Danish fleet as a whole. 
To have an overview, the table below shows the economic performance of the fishery as it was in 
2013 by fishing area and in total. As explained in the methodology section, the economic impacts are 
calculated as changes compared to this baseline situation.  
 
Table 1. Economic performance of the Danish fishery in 2013. 
 DKK 1,000
1 
 Baltic Sea 
  
Kattegat/ 
Skagerrak 
North Sea 
 
Total 
 
Revenue 278,135 493,440 1,745,283 2,516,858 
Variable costs 84,373 58,182 442,961 585,515 
Wages 61,155 42,651 366,602 470,408 
Gross Margin 132,607 392,607 935,720 1,460,935 
1 €1 = DKK 7.5 
Source: Own calculations based on Statistics Denmark 
 
The North Sea accounts for the largest share of revenue and costs. Kattegat/Skagerrak has almost 
twice the revenue as the Baltic Sea, but has lower costs, reflecting the high value species such as 
Norwegian lobster caught in Kattegat/Skagerrak.  
 
Scenarios 
To illustrate the impacts of the L.O. under possible management regimes and fisher behavior, the 
analysis is carried out for several different scenarios. The economic impact is calculated as changes 
from a baseline scenario: the fishery in 2013 without the landing obligation (scenario 0).  
As can be seen in table 1 below, scenarios with quota top-ups are labelled A-scenarios and scenarios 
without are labelled B-scenarios. A-scenarios thus entail the crowding out of more valuable 
consumption landings by previously discarded fish that now take up part of the quota.  
Scenarios A1 and B1 consider the imposition of the L.O. directly on the fishery as it was in 2013, 
without and with quota top-ups, respectively. Scenarios A2 and B2 are like A1 and B1 although with 
an additional cost of handling and landing previously discarded fish that need to be brought into 
harbor. A1, A2, B1, and B2 thus illustrate the situations in which no further management change 
takes place except the L.O. itself.  
Scenarios A3 and B3 are like A1 and B1 although with increased minimum sizes of cod and Norway 
lobster in some areas. This means that a quantity of previously discarded cod and Norway lobster 
above the new minimum size but below the old minimum size can obtain a consumption price instead 
                                                          
1 The Department of Food and Resource Economics classify commercially active vessels according to 
earnings. In 2012, the minimum earnings for being categorized as a commercial vessel was DKK 270,000. 
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of the price for fish meal and oil purposes. These scenarios thus illustrate the effect of the L.O. 
combined with a management measure to reduce potential economic adversity of the new policy.  
Further, under-utilized quotas are observed across species and areas. An increased utilization and thus 
landings revenue could reduce the negative economic consequences in face of the L.O. Therefore, an 
additional scenario without quota top-ups, A4, incorporates increased quota utilization. This scenario 
thus illustrate the imposition of the L.O. with no further management changes, but where behavioral 
changes initiated by fishers themselves can reduce negative economic impacts.   
Additionally, two scenarios called C1 and C2 resemble scenarios A1 and A2 but assume a behavioral 
change that reduces discard rates by 25 %. Scenario C2 is only calculated for the Danish fleet as a 
whole. These scenarios thus exemplify situations without additional management measures in which 
fishermen themselves find ways to reduce landings of previously discarded fish. This could for 
example take place by changing fishing time and place. The table below provides an overview of the 
scenarios: 
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Table 2. Scenarios 
Scenario Description Explanation 
0 
scenario 
Basis scenario: The Danish fishery in 2013 is 
used as basis for comparison 
2013 situation with discard for different segments and 
fishing areas 
Scenario 
A1 
2013 situation without quota uplift and 
therefore a reduction of landings and effort 
(Effort reduction) 
Reduction of catch value, the landings of previously 
discarded fish replace some of the wanted catch. Effort 
reduction (reduction in variable costs) in proportion to 
the reduction in catch 
Scenario 
A2 
As scenario A1 and additional costs  of 
handling former discard onboard (A1 + 
handling costs) 
Increased variable costs caused by costs of handling a 
more mixed catch. This can be viewed as a ”Worst Case 
Scenario” 
Scenario 
A3 
No quota uplift and therefore an effort 
reduction but a part of landed discard can 
now be sold for consumption (A1 + new 
minimum sizes) 
2013 situation, no quota uplift, but where the part of 
landed discard which was previously between the old 
and new minimum sizes will be sold for consumption 
(lowest price class) 
Scenario 
A4 
No quota uplift and therefore effort 
reduction, but with improved quota 
utilization (≤ TAC). (A1 + improved quota 
utilization) 
2013 situation, no quota uplift, but the quota utilization 
increases when the previously discarded fish is included 
in the quota 
Scenario 
B1 
2013 situation with quota uplift and no 
reduction in effort (Quota uplift) 
Landings = Previous landings + Estimated landed 
discard 
Scenario 
B2 
Quota uplift no effort changes but additional 
costs of handling former discard onboard (B1 
+ handling costs) 
Increased variable costs caused by costs of handling a 
more mixed catch.  
Scenario 
B3 
Quota uplift and a part of former discard can 
now be sold for consumption purposes (B1 + 
new minimum sizes) 
2013 situation, with quota uplift, but where the part of 
former discard which was previously between the old 
and new minimum sizes can be sold for consumption 
purposes (lowest price class) 
Scenario 
C1 
2013 situation with behavioral changes  
(A1+behavioral changes) 
C1 is like A1, but a change in behavior is assumed 
which reduces unwanted catches (former discard) by 25 
% 
Scenario 
C2 
2013 situation, with quota uplift and 
behavioral changes (B1+ behavioral 
changes) 
C2 is like B1, but a change in behavior is assumed which 
reduces unwanted catches (former discard) by 25 % (C2 
is only calculated for the total fishery) 
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Results  
Overall, fleet segments with higher discard rates are the most affected by the L.O., i.e. small and 
medium-sized trawlers. The results show a clear divide with respect to the effect of quota write-offs 
or quota top-ups on economic performance as seen in the A- and B-scenarios respectively. Quota-top 
ups allow fishermen to maintain their previous revenue while obtaining additional revenue from the 
sale of below minimum size fish to the fish meal and oil industry. A L.O. with quota top-ups may 
therefore benefit the fishermen. If on the other hand, the L.O. was to be implemented by writing off 
previously discarded fish on the quota, these will crowd out more valuable target fish and revenue and 
profitability losses are observed.  
A reduction of the minimum sizes of cod and Norway lobster also reduces losses compared to a 
situation of quota write-offs with no additional management measure. Further, a behavioral change of 
increased quota utilization where possible can reduce the economic losses for some segments. A 
(technically imposed) behavioral change reducing discard percentages by 25 % can also alleviate 
negative effects. New minimum sizes improve earnings and profitability in the B-scenarios compared 
to the baseline as well as compared to the L.O. with no further measures.  
Norway lobster, cod, and plaice in Kattegat, the Baltic Sea, and Skagerrak respectively affect results 
the most as these are highly valuable catches but at the same time have high discard rates for some 
segments and in some areas.  
Further, the assessment of activity impacts on the fishery and downstream industry shows that the L.O. 
could increase activity if implemented with quota top-ups, while it would decrease activity if 
implemented without.  
Tables with overall and partial results are presented below. The scenarios are listed to the left and 
downwards. Economic impacts are presented in either DKK 1,000 or in percentages compared to the 
baseline; the economic situation in 2013, and are listed horizontally for each scenario. For the overall 
and area specific results, physical impacts are presented; landings of previously discarded fish as well 
as changes in marketable landings, i.e. landings for human consumption. For vessel group specific 
results only the amount of landings of previously discarded fish are presented. 
The table below shows the overall scenario results for the entire Danish fishery calculated as changes 
compared to the baseline scenario. Implementing the L.O. without quota top-ups, as seen in the A-
scenarios, forces fishers to reduce effort. Here, the more valuable marketable landings are crowded out 
by less valuable landings of previously discarded fish now being sold to the fish meal and oil industry 
at a lower price. The L.O. implemented with no further management measures decreases effort and 
thus revenue and gross margin by 7 and 9 %, respectively. When taking into account the increased 
handling and landing costs, the revenue and gross margin decreases by 7 and 10 % respectively 
compared to the baseline. New minimum sized as well as increased quota utilization reduces economic 
losses. New minimum sizes in A3 reduce both revenue and gross margin by 4 % while increased quota 
utilization decreases revenue and gross margin by 3 and 4 % respectively. In these scenarios, the ratio 
between marketable and more valuable landings and previously discarded fish is increased compared 
to A1 and A2.   
Scenarios with quota top-ups (B-scenarios) illustrate that increasing quotas with the previously 
discarded amounts benefits fishers in tackling the L.O. The economic impact is almost neutral in 
scenarios B1 and B2 with increases in revenue of 0.4 %. Gross margins increase by 0.6 % in B1 
whereas taking into account increased handling costs in B2 reduces gross margin by 1 %. It can even 
bring about a slight increase in revenue and gross margin if minimum sizes are reduced, by 3 and 4 % 
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respectively. Behavioral changes reducing discard rates by 25 % will help reduce losses compared to 
A1 and A2, while the effect is almost neutral in compared to B1 and B2. The effects seen for the whole 
Danish fleet, however, cover differences between fishing areas and fleets, as explained in the 
following.  
Table 3. The Danish fleet 
 
DKK 10001 or % Ton 
changes in 
Scenarios 
∆ 
Revenue 
∆ Gross 
Margin 
∆ 
Revenue 
∆ Gross 
Margin 
∆ Discard 
landings2 
∆ Marketable 
landings 
A1:  Effort reduction 
(no quota adjustment) 
-168,815 -127,792 -7% -9% -3,896 -8,541 
A2: A1 + handling costs -168,815 -147,554 -7% -10% -3,896 -8,541 
A3: A1 + new minimum sizes -92,719 -65,272 -4% -4% -5,891 -6,328 
A4: A1 + increased quota 
utilisation 
-69,356 -58,270 -3% -4% -1,689 -2,469 
B1: Corresponding quota 
adjustment 
10,769 8,435 0.4% 0.6% 0 0 
B2: B1 + handling costs 10,769 -20,490 0.4% -1% 0 0 
B3: B1 + new minimum sizes 73,349 64,997 3% 4% -4,084 6,685 
C1: A1 + behavioural changes 
(25 % less discard landings) 
-126,613 -95,845 -5% -7% -5,614 -6,406 
C2: B1 + behavioural changes 
(25 % less discard landings) 
6,822 5,209 0.3% 0.4% -3,947 0 
1 €1 = DKK 7.5 
Source: Own calculations based on Statistics Denmark, The AgriFish Agency, DTU Aqua, etc. 
 
The table below show partial results for the fisheries in the Baltic Sea. Here, reductions in revenue and 
gross margin of 9 and 8 % take place in scenario A1 while handling costs in A2 increase losses in 
gross margin to 14 %. The discard rates for cod and plaice are rather high in this area while the gross 
margin is smaller than in other areas, so that an increase in costs causes larger reductions in gross 
margin. The B-scenarios show that quota top-ups can benefit the fisheries in the Baltic Sea compared 
to the baseline especially if there are no additional handling costs or in the case of new minimum sizes.  
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Table 4. The Baltic Sea 
 
DKK 1,0001 or % ton 
 
                                                                       changes in  
 
Scenarios ∆ 
Revenue 
∆ Var. 
costs 
∆ Profit 
ability ∆ Wages 
∆ 
Gross 
margin 
∆ 
Revenue 
∆ Gross 
margin 
Discard 
landings 
Marketable 
landings 
A1:  Effort reduction 
(no quota adjustment) 
-24,386 -7,711 -16,675 -6,187 -10,487 -9% -8% 2,706 3,628 
A2: A1 + handling costs 
-24,386 0 -24,386 -6,187 -18,199 -9% -14% 2,706 3,628 
A3: A1 + new minimum sizes 
-18,243 -7,711 -10,532 -4,145 -6,387 -2% -5% 1,947 2,868 
A4: A1 + increased quota 
utilisation 
-4,258 -2,095 -2,163 -325 -1,839 -1% -1% 3,401 743 
B1: Corresponding quota 
adjustment 
3,808 0 3,808 1,220 2,589 1% 2% 3,808 0 
B2: B1 + handling costs 
3,808 11,110 -7,302 1,220 -8,522 1% -6% 3,808 0 
B3: B1 + new minimum sizes 
11,189 0 11,189 3,693 7,496 3% 6% 2,862 0 
C1: A1 + behavioural 
changes 
(25 % less discard landings) 
-18,290 -5,784 -12,506 -4,641 -7,865 -7% -6% 2,030 2,721 
1 €1 = DKK 7.5 
Source: Own calculations based on Statistics Denmark, The AgriFish Agency, DTU Aqua, etc. 
 
Table 5. Skagerrak/Kattegat 
 
DKK 1,0001 or % ton  
                                                         changes in   
Scenarios ∆ 
Revenue 
∆ Var. 
costs 
∆ Profit-
ability 
∆ 
Wages 
∆ Gross 
margin 
∆ 
Revenue 
∆ 
Gross 
margin 
Discard 
landings 
Marketable 
landings 
A1:  Effort reduction 
(no quota adjustment) 
-123,453 -7,742 -115,712 -9,262 -106,449 -25% -27% 3,029 3,649 
A2: A1 + handling costs 
-123,453 0 -123,453 -9,262 -114,191 -25% -29% 3,029 3,649 
A3: A1 + new minimum sizes 
-59,080 -7,742 -51,338 -5,769 -53,221 -12% -14% 1,956 2,360 
A4: A1 + increased quota 
utilisation 
-64,486 -3,032 -61,454 -4,943 -56,511 -13% -14% 4,463 1,560 
B1: Corresponding quota 
adjustment 
5,738 0 5,738 355 5,383 1% 1% 5,738 0 
B2: B1 + handling costs 
5,738 13,559 -7,821 355 -8,176 1% -2% 5,738 0 
B3: B1 + new minimum sizes 
59,750 0 59,750 4,297 55,453 12% 14% 2,873 0 
C1: A1 + behavioural 
changes 
(25 % less discard landings) 
-92,590 -5,806 -86,784 -6,947 -79,837 -19% -20% 2,272 2,737 
1 €1 = DKK 7.5 
Source: Own calculations based on Statistics Denmark, The AgriFish Agency, DTU Aqua, etc. 
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The partial results for Skagerrak/Kattegat are presented above. Here, high rates of discarding of 
cod, Norway lobster, and plaice cause a decrease in gross margin of up to 29 %. If, however, new 
minimum sizes were introduced for cod and Norway lobster, important species in this area, the 
negative effects would be halved. If new minimum sized were combined with quota top-ups, the 
fleet would experience an increase in revenue and gross margin of 12 and 14 % respectively. 
As seen below, the North Sea fleets are not as affected by the L.O. as the fleets in the Baltic Sea 
and Kattegat/Skagerrak. The economic impact is only slightly negative in the scenarios without 
quota top-ups, being between 1-2 % losses in gross margin and 1 % loss in revenue. The effect is 
neutral where quota utilization is increased as well as in the B-scenarios where quotas are topped 
up. Low discard rates in the North Sea is the explanation for this.  
Table 6. The North Sea 
 
DKK 1,0001 or % ton  
                                                         changes in   
Scenarios ∆ 
Revenue 
∆ Var. 
costs 
∆ Profit-
ability 
∆ 
Wages 
∆ Gross 
margin 
∆ 
Revenue 
∆ 
Gross 
margin 
Discard 
landings 
Marketable 
landings 
A1:  Effort reduction 
(no quota adjustment) 
-20,976 -4,309 -16,668 -5,812 -10,855 -1% -1% 1,138 1,264 
A2: A1 + handling costs 
-20,976 0 -20,976 -5,812 -15,164 -1% -2% 1,138 1,264 
A3: A1 + new minimum sizes 
-15,396 -4,309 -11,087 -5,424 -5,663 -1% -1% 974 1,100 
A4: A1 + increased quota 
utilisation 
-612 -651 39 -41 80 0% 0% 1,216 167 
B1: Corresponding quota 
adjustment 
1,223 379 844 379 465 0% 0% 1,223 0 
B2: B1 + handling costs 
1,223 4,636 -3,413 379 -3,792 0% 0% 1,223 0 
B3: B1 + new minimum sizes 
2,409 0 2,409 361 2,048 0% 0% 950 0 
C1: A1 + behavioural 
changes 
(25 % less discard landings) 
-15,733 -3,231 -12,502 -4,359 -8,143 -1% -1% 853 948 
1 €1 = DKK 7.5 
Source: Own calculations based on Statistics Denmark, The AgriFish Agency, DTU Aqua, etc. 
 
In the following, results will be presented for the smaller vessels, 12-18m as well as for all vessels 
fishing with trawl.2 From a coastal fishery and socioeconomic perspective the smaller vessels are 
particularly interesting when faced with the L.O. Based on their discard rates, equipment, and target 
species the trawlers face specific challenges under the L.O. 
 
Below results are presented for gillnet and hook vessels between 12 and 15 meters. This is a rather 
large group, containing 22 vessels, although the actual changes in economic performance are 
modest. Relative changes in revenue and gross margin as a consequence of the L.O. are also modest 
                                                          
2 All in all the analysis covers 19 segments. Results for all fleet segments can be seen in the report “Analyse 
af de erhvervsøkonomiske konsekvenser af discardforbuddet” (Ravensbeck et al., 2015, in Danish) or 
requested from the authors. 
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- and neutral when quotas are top-upped. Further, there are differences between fishing areas with 
the vessels that operate in the Baltic Sea most affected by the L.O.  
 
Table 7. Gillnet/Hook 12-15m 
 
DKK 1,0001 or % ton 
                                   changes in  
Scenarios 
∆ Revenue 
∆ Var. 
costs ∆ Profitability ∆ Wages 
∆ Gross 
margin 
∆ 
Revenue 
∆ Gross 
margin 
Discard 
landings 
A1:  Effort reduction 
(no quota adjustment) 
-648 -101 -547 -81 -466 -2% -2% 34 
A2: A1 + handling costs -648 0 -648 -81 -566 -2% -3% 34 
A3: A1 + new minimum sizes -515 -101 -414 -74 -382 -2% -2% 30 
A4: A1 + increased quota 
utilisation 
-149 -28 -121 -15 -106 -1% -1% 35 
B1: Corresponding quota 
adjustment 
37 3 34 5 28 0% 0% 37 
B2: B1 + handling costs 37 108 -71 5 -77 0% 0% 37 
B3: B1 + new minimum sizes 79 0 79 9 69 0% 0% 30 
C1: A1 + behavioural 
changes 
(25 % less discard landings) 
-486 -76 -410 -61 -349 -2% -2% 26 
1 €1 = DKK 7.5 
Source: Own calculations based on Statistics Denmark, The AgriFish Agency, DTU Aqua, etc. 
 
Below are the results for the vessels 15-18 meters long using gillnet or hooks. The segment obtains 
most of its revenue from the North Sea and where the largest absolute changes are felt, while the 
activities in the Baltic Sea experience the largest relative changes. The segment experiences slightly 
negative impacts on revenue (-2-0 %) and gross margin of (-3-0 %) in scenarios without quota top-
ups and almost neutral effects in scenarios with top-ups. With increased quota utilization the 
segment can uphold its baseline economic performance as seen in scenario A4, while new minimum 
sizes can reduce the impact of the L.O. Behavioral changes reducing the catches of previously 
discarded fish by 25 % will have a neutral effect compared to a pure effort reduction as seen in 
scenario A1. 
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Table 8. Gillnet/Hook 15-18m 
 
DKK 1,0001 or % ton 
                                   changes in  
Scenarios 
∆ Revenue 
∆ Var. 
costs ∆ Profitability ∆ Wages 
∆ Gross 
margin 
∆ 
Revenue 
∆ Gross 
margin 
Discard 
landings 
A1:  Effort reduction 
(no quota adjustment) 
-1,291 -303 -988 -435 -553 -2% -2% 69 
A2: A1 + handling costs -1,291 0 -1,291 -435 -856 -2% -3% 69 
A3: A1 + new minimum sizes -913 -303 -610 -393 -217 -2% -1% 56 
A4: A1 + increased quota 
utilisation 
-50 -52 1 -21 23 0% 0% 73 
B1: Corresponding quota 
adjustment 
76 24 52 29 23 0% 0% 76 
B2: B1 + handling costs 76 334 -258 29 -287 0% -1% 76 
B3: B1 + new minimum sizes 181 0 181 44 137 0% 1% 56 
C1: A1 + behavioural 
changes 
(25 % less discard landings) 
-968 -227 -741 -326 -415 -2% -2% 52 
1 €1 = DKK 7.5 
Source: Own calculations based on Statistics Denmark, The AgriFish Agency, DTU Aqua, etc. 
 
Table 9. Danish seines/Gillnet/Trawl 12-15m 
 
DKK 1,0001 or % ton 
                              changes in  
Scenarios 
∆ Revenue 
∆ Var. 
costs ∆ Profitability ∆ Wages 
∆ Gross 
margin 
∆ 
Revenue 
∆ Gross 
margin 
Discard 
landings 
A1:  Effort reduction 
(no quota adjustment) 
-5,578 -1,071 -4,506 -694 -3,812 -19% -27% 359 
A2: A1 + handling costs -5,578 0 -5,578 -694 -4,883 -19% -34% 359 
A3: A1 + new minimum sizes -3,520 -1,071 -2,449 -483 -2,302 -12% -16% 265 
A4: A1 + increased quota 
utilisation 
-2,517 -183 -2,334 -206 -2,128 -8% -15% 452 
B1: Corresponding quota 
adjustment 
512 8 504 85 419 2% 3% 512 
B2: B1 + handling costs 512 1,530 -1,019 85 -1,104 2% -8% 512 
B3: B1 + new minimum sizes 2,264 0 2,264 308 1,956 8% 14% 367 
C1: A1 + behavioural 
changes 
(25 % less discard landings) 
-4,183 -803 -3,380 -521 -2,859 -14% -20% 269 
1 €1 = DKK 7.5 
Source: Own calculations based on Statistics Denmark, The AgriFish Agency, DTU Aqua, etc. 
 
The table above shows the results for vessels that are 12-15 meters long and fishing with Danish 
seines, gillnet, or trawl. Scenarios A1 and A2 show a decrease in gross margin of 27 and 34 % 
respectively. New minimum sizes or increased quota utilization, in scenarios A3 and A4, would more 
than halve the losses in gross margin from the L.O. with no quota top-up compared to a situation 
with additional handling costs. The fleet segment would experience increases in revenue and gross 
margin in the case of quota top-ups alone and in combination with new minimum sizes. The fisheries 
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for important species such as Norway lobster in Kattegat/Skagerrak as well as cod and plaice in 
Skagerrak and the Baltic Sea are particularly affected by the L.O.  
Table 10. Danish seines/Gillnet/Trawl 15-18m 
 
DKK 1,0001 or % ton 
                              changes in  
Scenarios 
∆ Revenue 
∆ Var. 
costs ∆ Profitability ∆ Wages 
∆ Gross 
margin 
∆ 
Revenue 
∆ Gross 
margin 
Discard 
landings 
A1:  Effort reduction 
(no quota adjustment) 
-7,309 -959 -6,350 -1,090 -5,261 -21% -31% 311 
A2: A1 + handling costs -7,309 0 -7,309 -1,090 -6,220 -21% -36% 311 
A3: A1 + new minimum sizes -3,620 -959 -2,661 -719 -2,181 -11% -13% 205 
A4: A1 + increased quota 
utilisation 
-5,244 -217 -5,027 -412 -4,615 -15% -27% 422 
B1: Corresponding quota 
adjustment 
542 6 536 171 364 2% 2% 542 
B2: B1 + handling costs 542 1,640 -1,098 171 -1,269 2% -7% 542 
B3: B1 + new minimum sizes 3,879 0 3,879 562 3,317 11% 19% 339 
C1: A1 + behavioural 
changes 
(25 % less discard landings) 
-5,482 -719 -4,763 -817 -3,945 -16% -23% 233 
1 €1 = DKK 7.5 
Source: Own calculations based on Statistics Denmark, The AgriFish Agency, DTU Aqua, etc. 
 
Results for the fleet of Danish seines, gillnet, or trawl between 15 and 18 meters are shown above. 
The segment experiences large negative impacts of the L.O. in the A-scenarios. New minimum sizes 
however can reduce the loss of revenue and gross margin to 11 and 13 % respectively, while 
increased quota utilization reduces losses in revenue and gross margin to 15 and 27 % respectively. 
New minimum sizes combined with quota top-ups brings about increases in revenue and gross 
margin of 11 and 19 %, respectively. A behavioral change reducing discard rates by 25 % can reduce 
the negative effects of the L.O. without quota top-ups to a 16 % reduction in revenue and 23 % 
reduction in gross margin compared to the baseline. Although the number of vessels is small (13) in 
this segment, it sees large absolute impacts of the L.O. as well as in relative terms. 
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Table 11. Danish seines 12-15m 
 
DKK 1,0001 or % ton 
                              changes in  
Scenarios 
∆ Revenue 
∆ Var. 
costs ∆ Profitability ∆ Wages 
∆ Gross 
margin 
∆ 
Revenue 
∆ Gross 
margin 
Discard 
landings 
A1:  Effort reduction 
(no quota adjustment) 
-1,287 -321 -966 -31 -935 -15% -15% 97 
A2: A1 + handling costs -1,287 0 -1,287 -31 -1,256 -15% -21% 97 
A3: A1 + new minimum sizes -965 -321 -643 -31 -932 -11% -15% 98 
A4: A1 + increased quota 
utilisation 
-520 -76 -444 -13 -431 -6% -7% 109 
B1: Corresponding quota 
adjustment 
117 0 117 3 114 1% 2% 117 
B2: B1 + handling costs 117 389 -272 3 -275 1% -5% 117 
B3: B1 + new minimum sizes 98 0 98 3 96 1% 2% 117 
C1: A1 + behavioural 
changes 
(25 % less discard landings) 
-966 -241 -725 -23 -701 -11% -12% 73 
1 €1 = DKK 7.5 
Source: Own calculations based on Statistics Denmark, The AgriFish Agency, DTU Aqua, etc. 
 
The economic impacts of the L.O. on Danish seines between 12-15 meters are presented above. This 
segment operates mostly in Kattegat/Skagerrak. Revenue and gross margin decreases by 15 % each 
in the A1 scenario. With additional handling costs, the revenue loss is also 15 % while the loss in 
gross margin is 21 %. If the vessels reduce their catches of previously discarded fish as in scenario 
C1 losses in gross margin would be slightly reduced compared to A1. Increased quota utilization 
could reduce losses in revenue and gross margin by about a half compared to in A1. The segment 
experience modest benefits from quota uplifts although additional handling costs leads to a reduction 
in gross margin of 5 % as seen in scenario B2.    
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Table 12. Danish seines 15-18m 
 
DKK 1,0001 or % ton 
changes in  
Scenarios 
∆ Revenue 
∆ Var. 
costs ∆ Profitability ∆ Wages 
∆ Gross 
margin 
∆ 
Revenue 
∆ Gross 
margin 
Discard 
landings 
A1:  Effort reduction 
(no quota adjustment) 
-1,164 -310 -854 -98 -756 -11% -10% 94 
A2: A1 + handling costs -1,164 0 -1,164 -98 -1,066 -11% -15% 94 
A3: A1 + new minimum sizes -845 -310 -535 -89 -678 -8% -9% 87 
A4: A1 + increased quota 
utilisation 
-561 -60 -501 -44 -457 -5% -6% 107 
B1: Corresponding quota 
adjustment 
112 1 111 11 100 1% 1% 112 
B2: B1 + handling costs 112 371 -259 11 -270 1% -4% 112 
B3: B1 + new minimum sizes 165 0 165 20 145 2% 2% 103 
C1: A1 + behavioural 
changes 
(25 % less discard landings) 
-873 -233 -640 -74 -567 -8% -8% 70 
1 €1 = DKK 7.5 
Source: Own calculations based on Statistics Denmark, The AgriFish Agency, DTU Aqua, etc. 
 
Above are the economic impacts on the Danish seine vessels between 15 and 18 meters. This fleet 
segment sees reductions in revenue and gross margin of 11 and 10 % respectively when the L.O. is 
introduced without quota top-ups. Additional handling costs in scenario A2 reduce the gross margin 
further. New minimum sizes would reduce losses only slightly compared to A1, whereas better quota 
utilization reduces losses of revenue and gross margin to 5 and 6 %. A behavioral change reducing 
catches of previously discarded fish, scenario C1, would reduce revenue and gross margin losses to 
8 % each. Quota top-ups alone as well as combined with reduced minimum sizes would increase 
revenue and gross margin slightly although increased handling costs in scenario B2 reduce the gross 
margin by 4 %. The activities in the Baltic Sea and Kattegat/Skagerrak are the ones most affected by 
the L.O.  
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Tabel 13. Trawl 12-15m 
 
DKK 1,0001 or % ton 
changes in  
Scenarios 
∆ Revenue 
∆ Var. 
costs ∆ Profitability ∆ Wages 
∆ Gross 
margin 
∆ 
Revenue 
∆ Gross 
margin 
Discard 
landings 
A1:  Effort reduction 
(no quota adjustment) 
-25,909 -2,004 -23,905 -2,629 -21,276 -28% -48% 813 
A2: A1 + handling costs -25,909 0 -25,909 -2,629 -23,280 -28% -52% 813 
A3: A1 + new minimum sizes 
-10,999 -2,004 -8,995 -1,328 -8,660 -12% -19% 399 
A4: A1 + increased quota 
utilisation 
-11,227 -573 -10,654 -750 -9,904 -12% -22% 1,275 
B1: Corresponding quota 
adjustment 
1,569 5 1,563 193 1,371 2% 3% 1,569 
B2: B1 + handling costs 1,569 3,716 -2,147 193 -2,340 2% -5% 1,569 
B3: B1 + new minimum sizes 
15,042 0 15,042 1,612 13,429 16% 30% 765 
C1: A1 + behavioural 
changes 
(25 % less discard landings) 
-19,291 -1,503 -17,787 -1,972 -15,816 -21% -35% 610 
1 €1 = DKK 7.5 
Source: Own calculations based on Statistics Denmark, The AgriFish Agency, DTU Aqua, etc. 
 
The table above shows the economic impacts on trawlers between 12 and 15 meters. When 
implementing the L.O., this group is affected the most in relative terms. Here, revenue and gross 
margins are reduced by 28 and 48 % respectively. With additional handling costs in scenario A2, 
gross margin decreases by 52 %. New minimum sizes or increased quota utilization would 
approximately halve the losses. The L.O. combined with new minimum sizes would reduce gross 
margin by 19 % while the L.O. combined with increased quota utilization would reduce gross margin 
by 22 %. On the other hand, significant increases in earnings are seen if the L.O. is combined with 
both a quota top-up and new minimum sizes (scenario B3) with an increase in gross margin of nearly 
a third. C1 shows the effect of reducing the catch of previously discarded fish by 25 % which would 
assist in reducing the losses from 48 % loss in gross margin in A1 to a 35 % loss in C1.  
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Table 14. Trawl 15-18m 
 
DKK 1,0001 or % ton 
changes in  
Scenarios 
∆ Revenue 
∆ Var. 
costs ∆ Profitability ∆ Wages 
∆ Gross 
margin 
∆ 
Revenue 
∆ Gross 
margin 
Discard 
landings 
A1:  Effort reduction 
(no quota adjustment) 
-38,520 -1,780 -36,741 -3,103 -33,637 -22% -37% 1,299 
A2: A1 + handling costs -38,520 0 -38,520 -3,103 -35,417 -22% -39% 1,299 
A3: A1 + new minimum sizes 
-16,407 -1,780 -14,627 -1,588 -14,035 -9% -15% 671 
A4: A1 + increased quota 
utilisation 
-16,819 -586 -16,233 -770 -15,463 -10% -17% 1,995 
B1: Corresponding quota 
adjustment 
2,435 7 2,428 346 2,082 1% 2% 2,435 
B2: B1 + handling costs 2,435 3,357 -923 346 -1,268 1% -1% 2,435 
B3: B1 + new minimum sizes 
22,916 0 22,916 1,930 20,986 13% 23% 1,211 
C1: A1 + behavioural 
changes 
(25 % less discard landings) 
-29,026 -1,335 -27,691 -2,327 -25,364 -17% -28% 974 
1 €1 = DKK 7.5 
Source: Own calculations based on Statistics Denmark, The AgriFish Agency, DTU Aqua, etc. 
 
Economic effects for trawlers of 15-18 meters are shown above. The group experiences large losses 
in revenue of 22 % in scenarios A1 and A2. Losses in gross margin are 37 % in A1 while the increased 
handling costs in A2 decrease the gross margin further to 39 %. New minimum sizes or increased 
quota utilization in a situation without quota top-ups could reduce economic losses in terms of both 
revenue and gross margin by more than a half. The segment would on the other hand gain 23 % in 
gross margin if the L.O. was implemented with quota top-ups while revenue would increase by 13 
% relative to a situation without the L.O.  
   
The table below shows the economic impacts on the fleet segment between 18 and 24 meters fishing 
with trawl. This segment is one of the most affected segments in the analysis. The segment targets, 
among other species, Norway lobster but with discard rates as high as 55 %. The segment experiences 
reductions in gross margin of 29 and 32 % depending on whether increased handling costs are taken 
into account. New minimum sized or increased quota utilization would reduce the losses 
considerably. Reducing discard rates by 25 % would reduce losses more moderately. If the L.O. is 
implemented with quota top-ups, the segment sees small benefits, while additional handling costs in 
B2 reduces gross margin slightly. Quota top-ups combined with new minimum sizes would however 
increase revenue and gross margin by 8 and 15 % respectively. 
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Table 15. 18-24m trawl 
 
DKK 1,0001 or % ton 
changes in 
 
Scenarios 
∆ 
Revenue 
∆ Var. 
costs 
∆ 
Profitability 
∆ 
Wages 
∆ Gross 
margin 
∆ 
Revenue 
∆ Gross 
margin 
Discard 
landings 
A1:  Effort reduction 
(no quota adjustment) -39,307 -2,796 -36,511 -4,330 -32,181 -17% -29% 1,414 
A2: A1 + handling costs -39,307 0 -39,307 -4,330 -34,977 -17% -32% 1,414 
A3: A1 + new minimum 
sizes -20,754 -2,796 -17,958 -2,580 -17,151 -9% -15% 919 
A4: A1 + increased quota 
utilisation -16,555 -1,080 -15,475 -1,518 -13,957 -7% -13% 1,831 
B1: Corresponding quota 
adjustment 2,230 61 2,169 268 1,901 1% 2% 2,230 
B2: B1 + handling costs 2,230 4,509 -2,279 268 -2,547 1% -2% 2,230 
B3: B1 + new minimum 
sizes 18,417 0 18,417 2,024 16,393 8% 15% 1,262 
C1: A1 + behavioural 
changes 
(25 % less discard landings) -29,410 -2,097 -27,313 -3,248 -24,066 -13% -22% 1,060 
1 €1 = DKK 7.5 
Source: Own calculations based on Statistics Denmark, The AgriFish Agency, DTU Aqua, etc. 
 
Overall, implementing the L.O. without quota-top ups (A-scenarios) will cause reduced revenues and 
profitability in the Danish fisheries. In that case, the fisherman has to replace target fish with 
previously discarded fish on the same quota. It will take fewer trips to fill the quota. Effort and 
therefore also variable costs are reduced. However, in the analysis it is assumed that non-target fish 
sell for a lower price than target fish for human consumption and thereby revenue is reduced. If it is 
assumed that handling and sorting non-target fish carries an additional cost, revenue and profitability 
decrease further. However, if minimum sizes on cod and Norway lobster are reduced, part of the 
previously under-sized and therefore discarded catch can be sold at consumption prices increasing 
revenue and reducing the overall losses from the L.O. Additionally, another scenario without quota 
top-ups but higher quota utilization analyses the effects of increasing utilization in order for the 
fishermen to better exploit the opportunities in their quotas. This would reduce losses from the L.O. 
The effect of this of course depends on the level of quota utilization in the starting point. In the 
absence of new minimum sizes or increased quota utilization, a technically imposed behavioral 
change reducing discard rates by 25 % alleviates losses.  
If implementing the L.O. without quota top-ups but in combination with reduced minimum sizes or 
by fishermen increasing their quota utilization losses can be reduced considerably, some places by 
more than 50 %.  
Increasing the quotas with the previously discarded amounts alleviates many of the potential losses 
and does under certain assumptions bring about economic gains for the fisheries. The latter especially 
refers to scenarios of reduced minimum sizes where previously discarded cod and Norway lobster 
can now be sold at consumption prices.  
The areas most affected by the L.O. are the Baltic Sea and Kattegat/Skagerrak while the fisheries in 
the North Sea are less impacted. By vessel group, small and medium sized trawlers are the ones most 
affected by the L.O. Here, the decrease in revenue is on average 20 %, while the decrease in gross 
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margin is between 30 and 50 %. Trawlers overall are indeed the group most affected experiencing 
revenue decreases of between 17 and 28 % and decreases in gross margin between 27 and 48 %.  
Because of high discard rates and highly valuable target catches for consumption, the fisheries for 
Norway lobster and cod in Kattegat as well as cod and plaice in the Baltic Sea and Skagerrak are 
affected the most by the L.O.     
 
Discussion and future work 
This paper analyzes the short-term economic consequences of the L.O. for the Danish fishing fleet. 
The analysis is carried out as if the full L.O. was implemented in 2013. The analysis assumes fixed 
fishery patterns, fishing prices, and fishing costs. Further, the analysis does not take into account 
changes in the fish stocks and possible changes in quotas in the Danish fishery. In the longer run, 
however, these assumptions do not necessarily hold. Therefore, dynamic analyses of impacts in the 
longer run are needed e.g. allowing stock effects and quota changes. For example, assuming full 
compliance with the L.O., the quota market will change as a consequence of the necessary complete 
matching by all vessels of all quotas to catch (Andersen et al., 2014).  
Future work on the L.O. is linked to the EU project Discardless (www.discardless.eu) which aims to 
assess the impacts of stock effects, technology changes, complex behavioral changes as well as 
imperfect control and enforcement on discarding. The project is led by DTU-Aqua, while the 
Department of Food and Resource Economics at the University of Copenhagen leads the economics 
work package. Ongoing work includes an assessment of long-run impacts of the L.O. on Danish 
fisheries by Hoff and Frost (2016, forthcoming). This explores adjustments to changing quota 
availability for a range of different scenarios assuming different management measures under the 
L.O., including reduced minimum sizes and a de minimis exemption. Indeed, how the de minimis 
exemptions are interpreted and implemented affects how fisheries will perform under the L.O. This 
also relates to the issue of choke species in quota managed fisheries. A de minimis exemption could 
e.g. allow discarding of what would normally be a choke species. As discussed by Andersen et al. 
(2014), the L.O. and the choke species problem in particular will influence the quota market as 
catches have to be matched by quotas. Further analysis could look into how quota markets will 
develop under the L.O. Future work will also include the impact of various management systems in 
achieving efficient discard reductions, investments in more selective gear, and the impact of varying 
degrees of non-compliance.  
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